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Abstract
We study the impact of economic policy on the importance of history and
expectations for the macroeconomic performance of an economy. In our model
the energy mix is based on the conversion of heterogeneous energy sources.
Markups over marginal costs are endogenous so that the marginal revenue
product of capital becomes non-monotonic in capital. We derive multiple
steady states and identify regions in which initial conditions are insufficient
as a selection criterion for development. In these situations, pure expecta-
tions determine the equilibrium selection process which is crucial for long-run
performance. Energy policy affects the interplay between history and expec-
tations by shifting the region where expectations matter and by affecting the
location of the equilibria in the dirty and the clean economy. We find that
taxes and subsidies should be used simultaneously to guide an energy transi-
tion. We argue that expectations and momentum effects are important for the
energy transition because they decrease policy costs and thus raise political
acceptance.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Transforming the energy system
World energy supply relies heavily on the use of fossil fuels. The associated side effects
of global warming as well as regional and local air and water pollution strongly suggest
transforming current energy systems. This can be done by reducing energy use, increasing
energy efficiency, and promoting renewable and cleaner energies. Based on the decisions
of the UN climate conferences, all countries will have to contribute to solving the global
climate problem by lowering their carbon emissions. The European Union has decided the
target of cutting per capita carbon emissions by 40 percent in 2030 against 1990 levels.
The presidents of China and the US recently announced their CO2 abatement targets.
For China it was stated that CO2 emissions will peak in 2030 and that the share of non-
fossil fuels in primary energy should be 20% by then. For the US it was announced that
it intends to reduce its CO emissions by 26-28% below its 2005 level in 2025.
Air quality has increasingly become a cause of major concern in many emerging economies.
Prominently, in cities like China’s capital Beijing, the effects of the extreme levels of air
pollution on daily life can increasingly be seen in the form of health problems, deserted
bike lanes, and people often staying at home or retreating to conditioned environments
of hermetically-sealed malls. Accordingly, the transition to a less polluting energy sector
and a cleaner and more sustainable economy is high on the political agenda.
But, what will be the impact of lower and cleaner energy use on the macroeconomic
performance of an economy? Can appropriate policy help avoiding unfavorable income
effects and how? There is widespread public concern that energy and climate policies
cause major costs. Then, efficient environmental policies in the form of Pigovian taxes
or pollution permits are difficult to implement politically. More optimistic analyses have
highlighted the positive impact of new energy technologies on general productivity and
economic dynamics. Therefore, subsidies for renewable energies and active technology
policies can be suitable alternatives or at least complements to taxes and permits. But
subsidies have to be financed by public funds which compete with other public needs
and duties. As a consequence, situations in which environmental policies cause limited
costs but have strong impacts on emission reduction and income growth appear to be
especially desirable. Are such cases realistic? The literature distinguishes between history
and expectations as determinants of an equilibrium selection process. If past development
(”history”) determines the transition to a long-run equilibrium, a shift to a new steady
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state requires significant and potentially expensive policy interventions which might be
hard to get approved by the political process. But if the equilibrium is determined by
”expectations” of a cleaner future production, policy has only to be active in an initial
phase. After that, induced investments may create speeding moments and policy-enforcing
momentum might materialize. Hence, expectation-driven equilibria can support initial
policy and lower the costs of the transformation of energy systems.
The paper at hand studies the macroeconomic effects of a policy-induced transition from
dirty to clean production. Notably, we identify macroeconomic conditions under which
expectations affect the trajectory chosen by market participants. We show how policy
instruments are able to trigger development with sufficient momentum, fostering at the
same time environmental quality, and increasing incomes. The cases in which long-run
equilibria are driven by the history of production or by expectations are formally derived.
Moreover, we study how economic policy affects the importance of expectations compared
to history.
We present a generic macroeconomic model with capital accumulation and a detailed
energy sector to study the interplay between policies and the multiplicity of equilibria.
In the model, energy is not simply a homogeneous input but, closer to real conditions,
an aggregate of heterogenous services. We derive how a policy promoting energy effi-
ciency can, under certain conditions, generate broad momentum, moving an economy to
a permanently higher activity and welfare level. This constitutes an especially attractive
option for policy making.
1.2 Approach and findings
To analyze the transformation of the energy sector we assume that final output is produced
by two types of intermediate input: dirty or clean. Dirty intermediates rely on capital
and fossil energy services while clean intermediates employ capital and renewable energy
services. Both intermediates are prefect substitutes and, initially, only the dirty sector is
active.3
We incorporate a number of stylized facts into our model. First, the energy sectors fea-
ture characteristic elements of the industry. We assume that energy services are based
on the conversion of heterogeneous energy sources like oil, coal, wind, solar, etc. which
is done by specialized firms. Heterogeneity may result from specific attributes of each
3It is a limiting case of a model with directed technical change where both technologies are active,
which we consider to keep the model analytically and numerically tractable; a model version where both
sectors are active simultaneously is available from the authors upon request.
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energy source, such as fixed costs, supply intermittency, back-up capacity, and pollution
intensity or by the specific supply conditions of the different firms like tariff structure and
reliability. As a consequence of these heterogeneities, both the quantity and the variety
of energy services have a productive value. Second, because energy services are incom-
plete substitutes for each other, they are supplied under the market form of incomplete
competition. Energy producers can charge a markup over marginal cost. In equilibrium
with free market entry, monopoly profits are used to cover the fixed costs. Third, capital
productivity is determined by the variety of energy services and economic policy. More-
over, capital is accumulated endogenously by investment decisions of the firms. Fourth,
following the standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, returns to capital are decreasing
in the capital stock. However, this useful and broadly used approach is not consistent
with the empirical observations of lacking convergence in per capita income (Barro, 1991),
the absence of large cross-country differences in interest rates, and the failure of capital to
flow from rich to poor countries (Lucas, 1990). Moreover, it cannot explain the deficiency
of real wages to develop in a countercyclical fashion and the decrease of the capital share
in the course of economic development. This is why we add a second main contribution
to our framework, which is to incorporate results on endogenous markups from the IO
literature. Specifically, we rely on Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1995), who find that
mark-ups interact with business formation, and Jaimovich (2007, 2008) who analyses the
interaction of markups with business cycles. Also, we build on the macroeconomic lit-
erature studying transitory behavior and the long-run performance of an economy using
endogenous markups, see Gali (1994, 1995). Assuming that markups are endogenous
and inversely related to the capital stock provides an attractive explanation for the dif-
ferent empirical observations mentioned above. Accordingly, we incorporate endogenous
markups and thoroughly explore the impact of the assumption on the transformation of
an economy from dirty to clean production. Fifth, to add another realistic element of
capital accumulation, we posit that capital cannot be increased without any frictions i.e.
we include capital adjustment costs in the model.
As a consequence of endogenous markups, the marginal revenue product of capital may
become non-monotonic in the capital stock. Hence, the possibility of multiple steady
states and multiple equilibrium paths for given initial conditions arises. Policies reducing
(end-user) energy prices or diminishing production costs of energy services lead to decreas-
ing markups and thus business creation. The main mechanism is that the competition on
energy markets becomes more intensive with economic development. Energy policy then
triggers the interplay between (dirty) history and (clean) expectations. Energy prices,
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energy use, pollution, and policy all affect capital productivity and, by this, the long-run
performance of the economy as well as the equilibrium selection process. To the best of
our knowledge, the present paper is the first to show how economic policy determines the
relevance of history versus expectations within a dynamic general equilibrium framework
comprising an accumulable stock.
Our framework distinguishes two regimes: A dirty regime in which the dirty technology is
active i.e. the dirty energy inputs are used (regime D) and a clean regime (labeled by C)
in which the clean technology is active i.e. the clean energy inputs are used. Each regime
is characterized by multiple steady states. An exemplary phase diagram in the q/K space
of the economy applying qualitatively to both regimes (D) and (C) is presented in Figure
1, with q representing the net present value of an additional unit of capital, K. We show
below that the interior steady state is unstable while the two exterior steady states are
saddle point stable. Now, in the neighborhood of the unstable steady state, the evolution
of the economy may be subject to global indeterminacy in the sense that the trajectories
leading to either the superior or the inferior steady state overlap such that expectations
determine the equilibrium selection process. Outside the region of the overlap initial
conditions (history) determine whether the inferior or the superior equilibrium is reached.
Economic policy and the state of the economy, expressed by installed capital equipment,
determine whether history or expectations shape the transition to the inferior or superior
equilibrium. The reason is that energy prices and production costs of energy services affect
factor productivity and thus the shape as well as the position of the q˙=0-isocline. In our
framework q relates to the net present value of one additional unit of capital. This implies
that the selection of the superior (inferior) transition path must be associated to favorable
(unfavorable) fundamentals in an admissible fashion. An entrepreneur has optimistic
expectations if she expects that everybody else has optimistic expectations regarding
the net-present value of additional capital equipment. In this sense our model shares
the common feature of self-fulfilling prophecy equilibria which is coordination failure. If
expectations matter, the state can align expectations and provide a momentum effect.
In an extreme case, energy policy determines even the number of equilibria: if factor
productivity is reduced (increased) drastically, only the inferior (superior) equilibrium
may survive. Moreover, we show that energy policy affects the relevance of history versus
expectations for the equilibrium selection process. Policy is thus not only determining
transitory behavior of an economy but also its long-run performance.
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Figure 1: Multiple steady states
1.3 Relation to the literature
The paper refers to the seminal contribution of Krugman (1991) who shows in a (partial-
analytic) model, featuring external economies and adjustment costs, that history and
expectations may both matter for economic development. He demonstrates that pure
expectations may determine a market equilibrium under certain conditions, substantiat-
ing the notion of ”self-fulfilling prophecy”. This model result is contrary to most of the
preceding literature, especially in environmental policy, where mainly past development
(”history”) sets initial conditions determining long-run steady state. The Krugman model
derives in detail how the parameters of the economy separate the relative impact of history
versus expectations. Scha¨fer and Steger (2014) extend this analysis for the equilibrium
selection process in a setting with capital and labor mobility. We take up the fundamental
concept and apply it to the energy transition. To introduce a potential role for expec-
tations in our framework we rely on a strand of literature stressing that the intensity of
market competition is not constant but depends on several determinants. Specifically, we
follow Gali (1994, 1995) and the empirical literature cited therein by introducing markups
for the intermediate goods producers which depend on the level of economic activity, given
by the capital stock. We then show that, under certain conditions, an energy transition
is able to trigger expectation-driven growth. For such a development one might use the
term of Lucas (1993) to call it an ‘economic miracle’ or, even in a more moderate way,
conclude that such a policy can have favorable effects for the economy turning it easier
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to get it through the political process.
Four major differences distinguish our contribution from previous literature. First, we
consider a dynamic general equilibrium setup with an accumulable stock which enables
us to derive stable interior steady states; hence we do not have to restrict ourselves to
corner solutions. Second, we do not rely on Marshallian externalities to generate the
necessary scale effects. Third, we explicitly derive how economic policy affects both the
emergence and the relevance of expectations for long-run development. Fourth, to the
best of our knowledge, the paper is the first to introduce and isolate the effects of market
expectations to the energy and climate literature. In fact, to derive the importance of
green policies for a transition to a cleaner economy, Acemoglu et al. (2012) focus on the
role of history. They use a two-sector model with directed technical change. Because
learning effects are sector specific, history favors the larger sector which is usually the
dirty sector of the economy. To change the pattern of development, policy is needed to
give the green sector the decisive initial push. Closest to our contribution is Van der
Meijden and Smulders (2016) which extends the approach of Acemoglu et al. (2012) by
introducing expectations in a directed technical change framework. The main difference
between their paper and ours is that they assume that changes in expectations stem from
new outside information about technical opportunities, while - in our case - agents are
fully informed about all the different technology options from the beginning.
While the literature acknowledges the relevance of both history and expectations for
the prospects of economic development, the two topics are usually not analyzed within
a common framework. To capture both within a single setup, two key ingredients are
necessary: (1) multiple steady states for history and (2) indeterminacy for expectations.
Regarding the latter, the literature distinguishes between local and global indeterminacy.
Local indeterminacy refers to the existence of a multiplicity of equilibrium trajectories
leading to a certain steady state. We argue that global indeterminacy is more relevant for
the given topic, which can be explained by using again Figure 1. Assume the economy is
initially located in a region around the interior (unstable) equilibrium, around which the
trajectories to either (stable) steady state may overlap. Notably, the existence of such an
overlap region requires that the superior (inferior) steady state is reached from a region to
the left (right) of the unstable interior steady state. Expectations about the net present
value of one unit of installed capital then trigger the selection of the trajectory to the
superior or the inferior equilibrium. It is precisely the existence of this overlap region
which gives rise to self-fulfilling prophecies and coordination failures.
In light of our research question, endogenous markups turn out to be a solid foundation for
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our theoretical model. Following this approach, multiple steady states arise through non-
monotonicities in the marginal product of capital while (global) indeterminacy emerges
when the interior unstable equilibrium exhibits complex eigenvalues. We will develop the
specific conditions for the emergence of the overlap region in the following. A special focus
will be how economic policy can affect both the emergence and the size of the overlap
region and hence the relevance of expectations. In this respect we depart from the ear-
lier literature (Benhabib and Farmer 1994, 1996) which discusses the role of expectations
within a framework of (local) indeterminacies by implementing externalities into the pro-
duction function and abstracts from economic policies.4 We do not want to challenge the
models using externalities but have chosen to incorporate endogenous markups because
of the microeconomic foundation, the empirical relevance, and the feasibility of interior
steady states.5
With respect to the emergence of self-fulfilling equilibria our work is also related to the
big-push literature of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943).6
The self-determination of the equilibrium path and the implications of coordination fail-
ure in our approach are similar to this literature. But we have to stress that we do not
model investment decisions which are affected by demand externalities. We rather fol-
low Krugman (1991) by assuming that the selection of the self-fulfilling equilibrium path
depends on expectations about the evolution of the co-state variable, i.e. the expected
net return of an additional unit of capital. As regards the emergence of coordination fail-
ure, our work has certain parallels to Cooper and John (1988) who analyze interactions
between the agents at the level of payoffs (spillovers) and ”strategic complementarities”,
i.e. the interaction of strategies. Here, it is important to emphasize that we consider a
continuum of agents such that each agent is of mass zero. Thus, only the aggregate of
4Benhabib and Farmer (1994) showed that a necessary and sufficient condition for indeterminacy in a
one-sector growth model is that externalities are large enough: an alternative path characterized by faster
capital accumulation can materialize as a self-fulfilling equilibrium, if this path generates higher returns
to capital supported by a reallocation of labor from leisure to production. The critical parameters are
thus the magnitude of increasing returns and the elasticity of labor supply. Subsequent estimates have
called the required magnitude of the parameters into question, see for example Basu and Fernald (1994).
Benahbib and Framer (1996) provide a version of a standard real business cycle model with sector-specific
rather than aggregate externalities that leads to indeterminacy for much smaller magnitudes of external
effects.
5Using the assumption of externalities, Krugman (1991) and Scha¨fer and Steger (2014) abstract from
accumulable stocks and do not derive interior steady states.
6The reason for the emergence of multiple equilibria in their model is the existence of a superior
technology and aggregate demand externalities. The superior technology becomes active if aggregate
demand is sufficiently high. Aggregate demand surpasses the critical threshold, however, only if everybody
invests in this superior technology which is the case if each entrepreneur expects that everybody invests.
In the opposite case, when expectations are pessimistic, the available technology is not implemented since
it is not able to break-even as aggregate demand falls short of a critical threshold. In light of this theory,
coordination failure leads to the selection of an inferior equilibrium while government action may align
expectations.
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individual actions will have repercussions on an individual agent but each agent alone is
not able to affect the payoffs of other agents. In our framework there is, hence, scope for
an interdependency of actions (Krugman, 1991) reflected by the size of the overlap, but
the term strategic interaction would not be appropriate in our context.
To characterize capital accumulation we take up several important insights from different
strands of literature. With new growth theory the importance of markups to provide
incentives for innovation and growth has been stressed; in the seminal contribution of
Romer (1990) markups determine profits and thus guide investors when inventing new in-
termediate goods varieties. Peretto and Smulders (2002) exploit the interaction between
endogenous growth and the market structure to remove the scale effect of the Romer
model. Similar to their approach we focus on the impact of market structure and derive
long-run policy effects which do not rely on scale effects. Le Van et al. (2010) combine cap-
ital accumulation with non-renewable resource extraction and assume a convex–concave
technology so that multiple equilibria arise; like them we study under which conditions a
country will escape from an inferior equilibrium with low welfare but add pollution and
a scope for expectations to the theory.
Confronting business cycle theory with actual data it was found in the industrial organi-
zation literature, see Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1995), that endogenous markups
provide an attractive explanation of failure of real wages to be countercyclical while raw
material prices are more procyclical than final goods prices. Our approach of medium-
term development in the energy sector is in line with the finding of Jaimovich (2007,
2008) who found that mark-ups interact with business formation. It also builds on the
DSGE-models making use of endogenous markups to analyze oil price shocks, e.g. Sanchez
(2011). Empirical evidence further suggests that markups are countercyclical (Banerjee
and Russell, 2004; Wilson and Reynolds, 2005; Jaimovich, 2006).
Looking at the longer run, it has been stressed that endogenous mark-ups drive both
transitory behavior and the long-run performance of an economy (Gali, 1994;1995). In
particular, using data of an international cross-section of countries, Gali (1994) finds em-
pirical evidence for a significantly negative correlation between markups and per capita
income. Gali (1994) also develops a theoretical model to show that markup variations
caused by changing demand may have a significant impact on the growth path of im-
perfectly competitive economies: they can generate multiple steady states and multiple
equilibrium paths for given initial conditions.
Following Gali (1995) we use the implications of endogenous markups for the dynamics
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of capital accumulation, where the degree of competition increases with economic devel-
opment. Specifically, in our model markups are inversely related to the level of economic
activity, given by aggregate capital stock. Then, the marginal revenue product of capital
may be non-monotonic in capital giving rise to the possibility of multiple steady states
and different equilibrium paths for given initial conditions. Since this is a crucial building
block of our theory, it is worth to elaborate a little bit more in detail on the reasoning
of endogenous markups. The inverse relationship between markups and the aggregate
capital stock implies that the elasticity of demand for differentiated intermediates is posi-
tively related to the capital stock (Gali, 1994;1995). An increase in the capital stock raises
aggregate output and thus demand for differentiated intermediates as well as profits of
each incumbent firm. The latter induces an entry of new firms, hence, more competition
and lower markups. Moreover, the entry of new firms raises the range of available types
of intermediates and increases the marginal product of physical capital if this effect over-
compensates the decline owed to the initial increase in physical capital. This establishes
the economic mechanism behind a non-monotonic revenue product of capital.
2 The framework
2.1 Households
We consider a Ramsey-type economy in which the utility function of households takes a
standard CRRA form
U(t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[c(t)1−σ − 1
1− σ −
P (t)1−ε − 1
1− ε
]
dt, (1)
where c is consumption, P denotes pollution, ρ the discount rate, t the time index, ε
represents the elasticity of marginal disutility from pollution and 1/σ is the intertemporal
substitution elasticity. Each household supplies inelastically one unit of labor services,
receives a wage income w and dividends from firms, pi. Moreover, households can borrow
and lend freely abroad at the world interest rate, r. Thus, the flow budget constraint of
the representative household describing the change in economic wealth, b, reads
b˙ = w + pi + rb− c. (2)
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2.2 Final output and pollution
For the production of final output, Y , we distinguish between two energy regimes: Regime
(D) which is characterized by the use of a polluting technology, and regime (C) where
only the clean technology is used. Pollution, P , is thus generated by the dirty technology
and assumed to harm final output. Specifically, pollution adversely affects total factor
productivity, provided that the output level of the dirty technology, Yd, exceeds a critical
threshold, Y critd . If Yd is below Y
crit
d , the level of flow pollution is set to its minimum level
ψ > 0. Thus, pollution P is determined by
P =
{
ψYd, if Yd > Y
crit
d
ψ, if 0 ≤ Yd ≤ Y critd .
7 (3)
In regime (D) final output production takes place according to
Y = P−γYd (4)
with γ ∈ (0, 1). In (C), the dirty technology is inactive and
Y = ψ−γYc. (5)
Yj, j = c, d, is produced by a [0, 1]-continuum of identical and fully competitive firms
employing capital, Kj, and a range differentiated energy services, ωj ∈ [0, Nj ], with xj(ωj)
denoting the quantity of intermediate ωj and Nj representing the number of available
differentiated energy services, in the clean or the dirty sector. The production function
of a representative firm reads
Yj = (Kj)
α
(∫ Nj
0
xj(ωj)
1
mj dωj
)mj(1−α)
, (6)
where α ∈ (0, 1). In our framework, mj is endogenous and determines the elasticity of
substitution, sj =
mj
mj−1
, for each pair of intermediates and thus the markup over marginal
production costs. Following Gali (1994, 1995) and the underlying empirical literature
we assume that the intensity of competition between (intermediate) firms increases in a
growing economy so that sj = sj(
+
Kj). In particular we specify
sj = µ+ µ ·Kκj (7)
7Note also that we assume without loss of generality Y critd = 1. We abstract from stock pollution
and neglect the accumulative force of pollution, since we aim to reduce the number of state variables
to a minimum. This enables us to provide graphical illustrations of our results in the two-dimensional
space. In any case, we do not expect that our results would change qualitatively with stock pollution. We
also refrain from introducing a separate abatement technology, which would e.g. represent the possibility
of using carbon capture and sequestration. Depending on the efficiency of the abatement technology, a
switch to the green regime could be delayed, but there would not be a substantial difference between
regime (D) with significant abatement and our setting with a clean technology. Thus one could consider
our case as the limiting case of complete abatement.
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where µ, µ, κ > 0, implying that
mj = mj(Kj) > 0
m′j(Kj) < 0.
8
Capital investment, Ij, is subject to a cost, CIj , given by the convex function
CIj = Ij
[
1 + θ
( Ij
Kj
)η]
, η, θ > 0. (8)
Denote the price of intermediate ωj by pxj(ωj), the instantaneous cash-flow of the repre-
sentative firm at date t, V (t)j, reads as
V (t)j = pjYj −
∫ Nj
0
pxj(ωj)xj(ωj)dωj − Ij
[
1 + θ
( Ij
Kj
)η]
.9 (9)
Recalling that the interest rate is given by r, firms maximize
max
{xj(ωj),Ij ,Kj}
{∫ ∞
0
e−rt V (t)j dt
}
,
subject to
K˙j(t) = Ij(t)− δKj(t), (10)
such that optimal demand for energy services reads as10
xj(ω
′
j) =
(1− α)pjYjpxj(ω
′
mj
1−mj
j∫ Nj
0
p
1
1−mj
xj d(ωj)
. (11)
Moreover, the optimal level of investments implies that
qj = 1 + (1 + η)θ
( Ij
Kj
)η
, (12)
where qj denotes the shadow value of one additional unit of capital installed under tech-
nology j. The evolution of qj is governed by
q˙j = (r + δ)qj −
[
MPKj −
∂CIj
∂Kj
]
= (r + δ)qj −
[
α
Y
Kj
+ θη
( Ij
Kj
)1+η]
. (13)
Obviously, in the absence of capital adjustment costs (θ = 0), the shadow value of capital
is constant and equal to one, see (12), such that q˙ = 0 and the marginal product of capital
takes the usual value MPKj = r+ δ. In the presence of capital adjustment costs (θ > 0),
the marginal product of capital deviates from r+δ since investment costs have to be taken
into account. Thus q˙ > 0(< 0) is owed to the fact that (r + δ)q is larger (smaller) than
the net marginal product of one additional unit of capital, such that further increases
(reductions) in the capital stock of the representative firm are indicated.
8Note that mj(Kj) =
sj(Kj)
sj(Kj)−1
. Thus, m′j(Kj) = −
s′j(Kj)
(sj(Kj)−1)2
and m′j(Kj) < 0 since s
′
j(Kj) > 0.
We need a specific functional form of sj in order to generate closed form solutions but as we will clarify
further below the qualitative results of our paper do not hinge on this specific form.
10See also A.1 in the Mathematical Appendix.
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2.3 Energy services
Energy services are heterogeneous and produced under monopolistic competition. The
production of xj(ωj) units of intermediate ωj ∈ [0, Nj ] is subject to fixed costs, φj, which
capture the overhead cost in units of the intermediate for a firm to enter the market.
The producer of intermediate variety ωj uses energy ej(ωj) and labor lj(ωj) as inputs to
produce a level of gross output xj(ωj)+φj. The level of net output of intermediate xj(ωj)
is determined by
xj(ωj) = Bjlj(ωj)
1−βej(ωj)
β − φj (14)
with β ∈ (0, 1) and Bj > 0 representing the total factor productivity in producing energy
services. Denote marginal production costs by cxj(ωj), operating profits write
pixj(ωj) = [pxj(ωj)− cxj(ωj)]xj(ωj). (15)
The first-order condition,
∂pixj (ωj)
∂pxj (ωj)
= 0, implies together with the profit maximizing de-
mand for energy services (11) the usual relationship between prices and mark-up over
marginal production costs
pxj(ωj) = mj(Kj) · cxj(ωj), (16)
where the profit maximizing mark-up over marginal production cost of intermediates
depends here inversely on aggregate capital, Kj, reflecting the level of economic activity
under technology j, i.e. m′j < 0. Dirty energy is imported while clean energy is produced
domestically, according to the following linear production function
ec(ωc) = BE,clE,c(ωc), (17)
with BE,c > 0 representing the factor productivity in the production of green energy.
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2.4 Trade and prices
Regarding energy supply, the model incorporates the global dimension of the markets for
(polluting) fossil fuels. As a matter of fact, the oil market is one of the most important
and most globalized markets, gas and coal have also become very international in recent
decades. Hence, (net) prices for fossil fuels are formed on the world market. Moreover,
it is specific to the energy sector that most forms of energy services are either taxed
or subsidized, with specific rates. In many countries, revenues of oil taxation are used
11We abstract from physical capital in the production of clean energy for notational convenience. Of
course, this assumption affects the opportunity costs of green technologies, but apart from that, the main
arguments of our research remain unaffected.
12
to build transportation infrastructure or to finance general public expenditures. On the
contrary, several types of (green) renewables are heavily subsidized by the government.
In cross-country comparisons it is usually found that the variation of energy consumer
prices are almost entirely explained by country-specific taxes and subsidies.
Accordingly, we assume energy prices (net of taxes) of fossils to be predetermined for
a single country and consider the case of a small open economy where the energy price
in the dirty regime, pEd , is exogenously given by world market conditions and domestic
policy, i.e. we have
pEd = p¯Ed + τ (18)
where p¯Ed is the world market price and τ the tax or subsidy of fossils set by policy.
12
Assuming the analogous small country assumption for the capital market leads to a world
interest rate which is given for a single country, i.e. we have r = r¯.13
3 Equilibrium
Without loss of generality we write expressions of aggregate intermediate goods in terms
of average values. Notably, average cost, prices, and quantities of intermediate goods
are written as cxj = cxj(ωj), pxj = pxj(ωj), and xj = xj(ωj) ∀ ωj, while average energy
productivity is Bj and average fixed costs φj, i.e. we abstract from heterogeneities in
terms of fixed costs which allows to make use of the elegant properties of a symmetric
equilibrium.14 Free entry drives profits down to zero, such that
pxjxj = cxj(xj + φj). (19)
As pxj = mj cxj , we obtain
xj =
φj
mj − 1 . (20)
Denoting further aggregate quantities of a variable zj byNjzj = Zj, the level of production
of differentiated energy services is given by
Njxj = BjE
β
j L
1−β
j −Njφj. (21)
12Regarding the clean regime, we will implement a subsidy to marginal production costs of clean energy
services. This modeling strategy seems to be the most realistic fit.
13We exclude the existence of natural resources in the domestic economy for simplicity. In a small open
economy the resource price is tight to global conditions. If resources were present domestically it would
simply increase the present value of consumption due to an income effect. This would not change any of
our results but possibly obscure the main mechanisms of our theory since then we would have to include
sustainability aspects as well. Moreover, we would again increase the number of state variables which
complicates both the presentation and the discussion of the results.
14Note that our framework still allows for differing fixed costs between clean and dirty energy services.
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Substituting now for xj by making use of (20), the available number of services compatible
to technology j is obtained as
Nj =
(mj − 1)BjEβj L1−βj
φj mj
, (22)
such that the level of Yj reads as
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Yj = (Kj)
α
(BjEβj L1−βj
mj
)1−α
. (23)
According to (23), the output level grows with total factor productivity in the production
of energy services and the inputs capital, energy, and labor, while a higher markup de-
creases final output. We normalize aggregate labor supply to unity, such that in regime
(D)
Ld = 1
and in regime (C)
Lc + LE,c = 1.
The energy price of fossils is determined according to (18) by the world market price and
taxes. Consequently, in regime (D) profit maximizing behavior implies pEd =
∂Yd
∂Ed
, such
that aggregate demand for fossils is obtained as
Ed =
[P−γβ˜
pEd
(Kd)
α
(Bd
md
)1−α] 1
1−β˜
,
with β˜ = (1− α)β. Observing (3), the pollution level reads then
P = ψ
1−β˜
1−β˜(1−γ)
(
β˜
pE,d
) β˜
1−β˜(1−γ)
(
Bd
md
) 1−α
1−β˜(1−γ)
K
α
1−β˜(1−γ)
d (24)
and the level of final output in regime (D) including pollution is obtained as16
Y = A˜d
(
Bd
md
) (1−α)(1−γ)
1−β˜(1−γ)
K
α(1−γ)
1−β˜(1−γ)
d , (25)
where A˜d = ψ
−γ
1−β˜(1−γ)
(
β˜
pE,d
) β˜(1−γ)
1−β˜(1−γ)
. In regime (C), aggregate energy supply is produced
domestically according to (17). The labor market equilibrium implies17
LE,c = β (26)
Lc = 1− β. (27)
15In order to ease the notation, we modified the production function of final output slightly, in
the sense that now Yj = (Kj)
α
[
N
1−mj
j
( ∫ Nj
0
xj(ωj)
1
mj dωj
)mj]1−α
= (Kj)
α
[
N
1−mj
j N
mj
j xj
]1−α
=
(Kj)
α(Njxj)
1−α,which is a standard procedure in literature, see Jaimovich (2007).
16Note that Yd = ψ
−γβ˜
1−β˜(1−γ)
(
β˜
pE,d
) β˜
1−β˜(1−γ)
(
Bd
md
) (1−α)
1−β˜(1−γ)
K
α
1−β˜(1−γ)
d .
17See A.2 in the Appendix.
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As the pollution level is fixed to its minimum possible value, ψ, we obtain18
Y = A˜c
(Bc
mc
)1−α
Kαc , (28)
with A˜c = ψ
−γ
[
(BE,cβ)
β(1 − β)1−β
]1−α
. Like in the other cases, output is increasing in
capital and total factor productivity, A˜j. The latter will become central because policy
affects through variations in τ , A˜d and by this final output.
19 Households maximize (1)
subject to (2) and take r¯ = ρ as given, such that the level of consumption is obtained by∫ ∞
0
c(t)e−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
[w + pi]e−ρtdt+ b0 (29)
=
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
Ic(ψ−γYc − CIc) + (1− Ic)[(P−γYd − CId)− p¯E,dEd]
]
dt
+b0 (30)
= ν0, (31)
with b0 ≶ 0 representing the initial value of wealth or debts, Y −CIj represents net-output
of technology j, and p¯E,dEd the import value of fossils. Moreover, Ic is an indicator
variable, with Ic = 1 if the clean technology is applied and zero otherwise. Apparently,
the present value of consumption equals the present value of net output.20 Integrating
the left-hand side and noting that ρ = r¯, we obtain
c(t) = r¯ ν0. (32)
Eq. (32) says that consumption is constant with given ν0, which - according to Eq. (29)
- materializes when the regime is determined and no policy change affecting the output
is implemented. Energy policy e.g. in the form of taxes on dirty energy or subsidies on
clean energy alters total factor productivity inducing a permanent change in net output,
consumption, and welfare. As welfare is negatively affected by pollution, a switch from
the dirty to the clean regime ceteris paribus increases welfare in the economy.
4 Steady states
In this section, we present conditions for the emergence of multiple steady states and the
corresponding stability properties.
18Where Yc =
[
Bc
mc
(BE,cβ)
β(1− β)1−β
]1−α
Kαc .
19A subsidy of green energy services will change Ncxc and thus affect
Bc
mc
directly through the subsidy
and indirectly through the change in the marginal productivity of capital, and thus mc, but this is
qualitatively equivalent to variations in A˜c as will become clear further below.
20After taking account for the import value of fossils in the dirty regime, of course.
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Since the level of consumption is time invariant, see Eqs. (29) and (32), the dynamics of
the economy is, due to the existence of convex capital adjustment cost, solely driven by
the evolution of the capital stock Kj and its shadow price qj
q˙j = (r¯ + δ)qj −
[
MPKj + θη
( Ij
Kj
)1+η]
(33)
K˙j = Ij − δKj, (34)
with j = c, d and the marginal product of capital MPK reading
MPKd = αA˜d
(
Bd
md
) (1−α)(1−γ)
1−β˜(1−γ)
K
α(1−γ)
1−β˜(1−γ)
−1
d , (35)
MPKc = αA˜c
(Bc
mc
)1−α
Kα−1c . (36)
In steady state, labeled by *, we have K˙j = q˙j = 0, such that investments equal the
amount of depreciated capital
Ij,∗ = δKj,∗. (37)
Eq. (37), together with optimal investment decisions obtained from (12), implies that
qj,∗ = 1 + (1 + η)θδ
η (38)
which is obviously independent from Kj.
21 On the other hand, q˙j = 0 determines, in light
of (33), qj,∗ implicitly as a function of Kj
qj,∗ =
MPKj,∗ + θη
(
qj,∗−1
(1+η)θ
) 1+η
η
r¯ + δ
. (39)
Moreover, as mj = mj(Kj), with m
′
j(Kj) < 0, the marginal product of capital is not
necessarily declining in Kj. Thus, qj,∗ implicitly defined by (39) may intersect (38) more
than once in the {Kj; qj}-plane, which gives rise to multiple steady states. The following
proposition characterizes the conditions for the emergence of multiple steady states.22
Proposition 1
(i) Exogenous mark-ups: if mj is constant and independent from Kj, there exists a
unique saddle-point stable steady state.
(ii) Endogenous mark-ups: if mj = mj(Kj), and κ > 1
(a) limK→0MPKj =∞ and limK→∞MPKj = 0.
21The derivative of the Hamiltonian of a representative firm with respect to Ij implies qj = 1 + (1 +
η)θ
(
Ij
Kj
)η
. For further details we refer to the Appendix.
22For a proof see Appendix A.4.
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(b) The necessary condition for multiple steady states is
(αγ˜j − 1)mj
Kj
= γ˜j(1− α)∂mj
∂Kj
, (40)
with γ˜d =
(1−γ)
1−β˜(1−γ)
and γ˜c = 1.
The parameter κ, reflecting the intensity of the impact of capital on the substitution
elasticity, see Eq. (7), governs the shape of the q˙j = 0 locus in the {Kj; qj}-plane.
Given item (ii),(b) of the above proposition, the necessary condition for the emergence
of three steady states, together with (a), is κ = 2.23 The emergence of multiple steady
states stems from the inverse relationship between the number of intermediate firms and
markups and the requirement that this relationship overcompensates the decline in the
marginal productivity of physical capital in response to an increase in Kj. Therefore it
is important to note that our qualitative results do not hinge on the specific functional
form of sj as specified by Eq. (7).
24
From Eq. (12) and Eq. (38), we observe that qj ≷ qj,∗ implies (Ij/Kj) ≷ δ, such that
in light of Eq. (34), K˙j ≷ 0. This situation is reflected by the horizontal vector arrows
in Figure 1. Above (below) the q˙j = 0-isocline determined by Eq. (33), the sum of the
marginal product of capital and marginal installation cost, MPKj + θη
(
Ij
Kj
)1+η
, is for
a given qj below (above) the level that would assure q˙j = 0. Thus for the region above
the q˙j = 0-isocline it follows that q˙j > 0 while below it we have q˙j < 0. In Figure 1, this
situation is characterized by the vertical arrows. We therefore conclude that the case of
three steady states in the figure is characterized by two exterior saddle-point stable steady
states and one interior unstable steady state. In the dirty regime, the steady state with
the highest capital stock implies the highest value of net output and consumption given
any level of initial wealth. However, as utility is negatively affected by pollution, highest
output does not imply highest welfare; it depends on the shape of the utility function,
23With κ = 2 our model generates, depending on the scenario, a markup of around 1.5 at the superior
steady state which is above average markups estimated for example by Norrbin (1993) implying a range
between 1.05 and 1.4. If we acknowledge that these values represent average estimates and if we look
at services and the energy sector alone we find that markups are usually higher than the above interval.
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012) estimate for services a range of 1.26 for France to 1.87 for Italy and
an average of 1.56 for the Euro area. Molnar and Bottini (2008) estimate for the energy sector a range of
1.16 for Denmark to 1.93 for Finland and for a small group of countries like France even a value of 2.8.
Thus κ = 2 lies in the empirically relevant range. Note that we choose the specific parametrization only
to illustrate the results in an intuitive way. The aim of this paper is not a quantitative analysis of policy
shocks.
24Obviously, a functional form different from eq.(7) would just change parameter restrictions and/or
impede analytical closed form solutions but not change the reasoning of our paper. Thus, the results in
our paper as well as in Gali (1994,1995), depend on the presence of a negative relationship between the
number of firms and equilibrium markups, but neither on the particular functional form nor a particular
mechanism chosen to generate this relationship, see Gali 1995, p. 41 and Gali (1994) for a version with
markups depending on the savings rate.
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specifically on the parameter ε. This is the main difference to the clean regime, where
highest net output and consumption directly translate into highest welfare.
5 Energy transition
We now show how expectations can provide momentum for a policy induced transition
from a polluting to a clean technology. In the next subsection, we discuss the importance
of history versus expectations for the equilibrium selection process and how economic
policy affects the relevance of expectations. Then, we discuss two conventional policy
instruments, a tax on fossils and a subsidy on clean energy services, that may induce a
speedy transition from dirty to clean technologies.
5.1 History, expectations, and policy
We assume that the economy starts in regime (D). The clean technology is known but
not active, which may be due to a lower productivity in the production of energy services.
For the sake of brevity we will focus the discussion on regime (D); the analysis of regime
(C) is qualitatively identical.25 The switch from the dirty to the clean regime will be the
subject of the following subsection. The level of final output is given by (25) and the
dynamics of the economy is governed by (33) and (34) with j = d. Whether expectations
play a role for the model solution depends on the existence of a range of initial states
expressed by the capital stock, for which the saddle point trajectories to the exterior
steady states overlap. If such a range of states exists, knowledge about the initial state
of the economy is insufficient to select the relevant trajectory for economic development.
Then, the equilibrium selection process is driven by expectations about the value of the
co-state variable, qd. Outside the overlap region the equilibrium selection is purely driven
by initial conditions, the usual situation in most economic models. In our case, the overlap
consists of a range of capital stocks Kd ∈ [Kd;Kd] in the neighborhood of the interior
steady state. With favorable expectations, the superior steady state can be reached from
a region lying to the left of the unstable steady state. Conversely, there is the risk that the
inferior steady state may be reached, with pessimistic expectations, from a region to the
right of the interior steady state. Technically, the emergence of the overlap depends on
whether or not the vector field allows for a transitions from the left (right) of the interior
steady state to the superior (inferior) steady state. Therefore, the existence of the overlap
25Note again, that economic policy affects A˜d in regime (D) and
Bc
mc
in regime (C). The latter is
qualitatively similar to a change in total factor productivity.
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Figure 2: Vector fields for real eigenvalues at the interior steady state (left-hand side) and
complex conjugate eigenvalues (right-hand side).
is tied to the emergence of complex conjugate eigenvalues at the interior steady state. We
present an illustration of this argument in Figure 2. The left-hand panel is characterized
by real eigenvalues at the interior equilibrium such that the existence of an overlap region
becomes infeasible. If, in contrast, the interior steady state exhibits complex conjugate
eigenvalues, the vector field illustrates that a transition to either equilibrium becomes
feasible in a region around the unstable steady state. We provide more details on this
issue below.
At this point it is interesting to note that the emergence of both central model elements,
multiple steady states and an overlap region seems to depend on the position of the q˙ = 0-
isocline and even more important: The position of this isocline and the role of expectations
can be influenced by economic policies. In the following proposition, we summarize how
both, the location of the q˙ = 0-isocline and the role of expectations depend on the total
factor productivity of technology j (A˜j).
Proposition 2
(i) An increase (decline) in total factor productivity A˜j moves the q˙j = 0-isocline in
the {Kj; qj}-plane upwards (downwards).
(ii) If κ = 2 there are three steady states, if A˜j ∈ [A˜j,min, A˜j,max]. If A˜j < A˜j,min only the
inferior steady state survives. If A˜j > A˜j,max only the superior steady state survives.
In both cases the dynamics of the economy are driven by initial conditions.
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Figure 3: Variation in fossil energy prices, pE,d, through a decline in taxes , τ : left-hand
side versus an increase: right-hand side.
(iii) If A˜j ∈ [A˜j,min, A˜j,max] and A˜j ≤ A˜j,crit the interior steady state exhibits real eigen-
values and complex conjugate eigenvalues if A˜j > A˜j,crit.
In Figure 3, we illustrate items (i) and (ii) of the above proposition, i.e. the effect of an
increase or a decline in energy prices through a variation in taxes per unit of fossil energy.
Noting Eq. (35), it becomes apparent that a change in energy prices alters the marginal
product of capital. Then, given (39), an increase in energy prices shifts the q˙d = 0-locus
downwards while a decline shifts it upwards. For sufficiently strong variations in energy
prices, the multiplicity of steady states vanishes such that the economy transits to a steady
state characterized by either a low or a high level of installed capital and thus aggregate
output.
Item (iii) is illustrated by Figure 2. If A˜d is such that the existence of multiple steady
states is assured, i.e. A˜j ∈ [A˜j,min, A˜j,max], it is not guaranteed that expectations matter.
This is only the case, if in addition A˜j exceeds within this range a critical threshold A˜j,crit
meaning that A˜j,min < A˜j,crit < A˜j ≤ A˜j,max. This result is important since economic
policy triggers in both energy regimes (i) the number and the position of steady states,
and (ii) the existence of an overlap region. Moreover, we will show below that not only
the existence of an overlap region but also its size will be determined by economic policy
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in a systematic fashion, affecting the risks and chances to converge to the exterior steady
states.
Before analyzing the impact of policy we discuss the overlap region and the role of ex-
pectations in more detail. The existence of an overlap region is illustrated in Figure 4,
where the interior steady state exhibits two complex conjugate eigenvalues with positive
real parts. Obviously, there exists a range of capital stocks Kd ∈ [Kd;Kd], in the neigh-
borhood around the interior steady state, where the saddle-point trajectories to either
steady state overlap. Thus, the equilibrium selection process within this region is entirely
driven by expectations and outside the overlap by history. The detection of this region
requires the solution of a non-linear system of differential equations and thus the appli-
cation of numerical methods. Here, we employ the Relaxation algorithm and search the
lowest feasible Kd as an initial point for the transition to the superior steady state and
the highest feasible Kd as an initial value for the saddle-point trajectory to the inferior
steady state.26
As regards the determination of expectations several remarks are at order. Expectations
are reflected by the selection of the costate variable, qj, which is by no means arbitrary
but related to fundamental characteristics of the economy. This can be seen very clearly
by integrating (33) for j = d
qd =
∫ ∞
0
[
MPKd − ∂CId
∂Kd
]
e−
∫ τ
0 (r¯+δ)dsdτ. (41)
Obviously, qd relates to the present value of the marginal product of capital minus the
change in installation costs, i.e. the net present value of one additional unit of capital.
This implies that the selection of the superior (inferior) transition path must be associ-
ated to favorable (unfavorable) fundamentals in an admissible fashion. An entrepreneur
has optimistic expectations if she expects that everybody else has optimistic expectations
regarding the net-present value of additional capital equipment. In this sense our model
shares the common feature of self-fulfilling prophecy equilibria which is coordination fail-
ure. If expectations matter, the state can align expectations and provide a momentum
effect. The important aspect here is, again, that expectations relate to fundamentals of
26We employ the Relaxation algorithm since this method is numerically the most efficient one in order
to detect a transition path from a certain initial point, i.e. Kj,0 given, to a steady state characterized
by (qj,∗;Kj,∗). In theory we could also use for example backward integration, see Brunner and Strulik
(2002). This procedure exhibits drawbacks if the dynamic system is stiff. Moreover, to find a certain
trajectory that fulfills all initial problems, an iteration process is required which typically gives rise to
problems of convergence reenforced by the fact that we increase the distance to the steady state. Applying
the Relaxation algorithm avoids this shortcomings and leads to a numerical error, if the initial capital
stock is not part of the trajectory to the steady state under consideration. Clearly, linearization methods
do not deliver such a precise criterion of exclusion. For more details on the Relaxation algorithm, see
Trimborn et al. (2008).
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Figure 4: History versus expectations
the economy!
For the economic intuition behind eq.(41) it is important to see that this equation is
conceptually interlinked with the well known no-arbitrage condition implied by an asset
market equilibrium: suppose an owner of one unit of capital equipment earns a stream
of dividends pi(t)net. In addition to this claim, the unit of capital is subject to gains and
losses, expressed by q˙. Investors are willing to hold the claim, if the total return equals
the return of a save consumption loan of size q, such that the following arbitrage condition
has to be satisfied pi(t)net + q˙(t) = rˆq(t), which immediately implies that
q˙(t)− rˆq(t) = −pi(t)net. (42)
Integrating the last equation and noting that limt→∞ q(t)e
−
∫ τ
0 rˆ ds = 0 yields27
q(0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ τ
0 rˆ dspi(t)netdt, (43)
where in our case: rˆ = r¯ + δ and pi(t)net =
[
MPKj − ∂CId∂Kd
]
, such that we obtain again
to (41). The time paths of installed capital, Kd, and its shadow price, qd, are depicted
in Figure 5. There, we present the transition to the superior (inferior) steady state in
the upper (lower) part of the figure. In light of (41), qd reflects the present value of the
net return of one additional unit of installed capital. Thus, the transition to the superior
steady state requires that qd is above its long-run value qd,∗ which was just sufficient to
27limt→∞ q(t)e
−rˆt = 0 follows from the existence of a steady state.
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Figure 5: Time paths of Kd and qd to the superior steady state (upper panel) and the
inferior steady state (lower panel)
sustain the long-run level of installed capital, Kd,∗ by guaranteeing that Id,∗ = δKd∗ .
Hence, qd > qd,∗ induces Id > Id,∗ and thus K˙d > 0. Symmetrically, qd < qd,∗ implies
Id < Id,∗ and thus K˙d < 0 (see the lower panel of Figure 5).
From Eq. (24) we know that the pollution level is increasing in Kd. Thus the steady state
with the highest level of installed capital generates the highest level of pollution and is
associated with the highest level of (net-) output, see (25). Because of our welfare function
Eq. (1) where pollution enters negatively, maximum output does not imply maximum
welfare, however. The switch to the green technology is beneficial if the adverse effects of
pollution on TFP and welfare are strong and the import value of fossils is high.
Based on Propositions 1 and 2, we summarize the effects of policy on the energy transition
in the following corollary.
Corollary 1
(i) Economic policy is decisive for the emergence of multiple steady states and the
importance of expectations in the equilibrium selection process.
(ii) In regime (D), economic policy affects total factor productivity through pollution
taxes, τ . In regime (C), total factor productivity is improved by production subsidies
on energy services which reduce markups.
(iii) The simultaneous implementation of taxes and subsidies provides the best conditions
for reaching highest welfare.
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Figure 6: Increase in TFP for example caused by a change in pE,d. Variables q˜d and K˜d
are expressed in ratios to the interior steady state. Dotted line: low TFP; dashed line:
increase in TFP of 0.5%; solid line: increase in TFP of 1%.
In both energy regimes, economic policies affecting total factor productivity A˜j trigger (i)
the number and the position of steady states as well as (ii) the existence and the size of
an overlap region. By steering the size of the overlap region, economic policies influence
thus the relevance of expectations. In order to elaborate on this argument more in detail,
we consider non-drastic changes in A˜j meaning that A˜j remains above A˜j,crit and below
A˜j,max which assures both, the existence of multiple steady states and an overlap region.
Non-drastic improvements in TFP move both exterior steady states to the right, since the
q˙d = 0-isocline moves upwards. This upward shift is owed to the increase in the marginal
productivity of capital. In addition, the TFP change affects the size of the overlap in a
systematic fashion. We illustrate this effect in Figure 6. There, we increased the TFP by
0.5% (dashed line) and 1% (solid line) relative to the baseline scenario (dotted line). For
the sake of visual clarity we normalized qd and Kd relative to the interior steady state.
The new adjusted variables, q˜d and K˜d, reflect thus the distance to the interior steady
state which has been normalized to 1. Obviously an increase in TFP moves the transition
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path to the inferior and the superior steady state upwards. As can be seen clearly, the
relative importance of expectations for the transition path to the superior steady state has
increased while the relative importance of expectations for the transition to the inferior
equilibrium is reduced. This mechanism follows a clear economic reasoning: From (41) we
know that qd(t) is associated to the net present value of one additional unit of installed
capital. Obviously, an increase in TFP must increase qd(t). This mirrors the upward shift
of the transition paths. Thus, an increase in TFP reduces the risk that firms located to the
right of the interior steady state mover under comparatively favorable initial conditions
but pessimistic expectations to the inferior steady state. At the same time the chance
to reach the superior steady state has increased since firms located further to the left of
the interior steady state (relatively unfavorable initial conditions) have now a chance to
transit towards the superior steady state if they are sufficiently optimistic.
The above reasoning is also valid for regime (C) characterized by an inactive dirty sector.
Everything else equal, total factor productivity in the green regime exceeds factor pro-
ductivity in the dirty regime as aggregate pollution is at its minimum possible value ψ.
Net output shrinks in regime (C) compared to regime (D) since labor has to be allocated
to energy production. On the other hand, firms switching to the green technology save
on energy imports.
5.2 Regime switch
We finally discuss the centerpiece of the energy transition which is the switch from dirty to
clean production. We shall assume that the clean technology is known but comparatively
less productive. With respect to policy instruments we consider taxes on fossils and a
subsidy on marginal production costs of clean energy services.
In Figure 7, we depict again the q˙j- and the K˙j-isocline, i.e. equations (33)-(36), and
illustrate the introduction of a tax on fossils, τ > 0, on the location of the steady states
induced by variations in A˜d. Since the dirty technology is more productive, its superior
steady state is the highest in the economy. Nevertheless, the inferior steady state of the
clean technology is higher compared to the inferior steady state of the dirty technology. A
sufficiently high tax on fossils reduces A˜d and moves all the steady state levels of the dirty
technology in a position below the corresponding level of the clean technology. As the
clean technology is less productive, the relative importance of expectations will shrink to
the left and increase to the right of the unstable equilibrium. Thus, if firms located in the
overlap region are pessimistic in terms of the net present value of one additional unit of
installed capital the regime switch may increase the risk that the inferior equilibrium will
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Figure 7: Clean technology is less productive. Panel (a): fossils are not taxed, panel (b):
fossils are taxed.
be selected, see also Figure 6. Hence, enforcing a regime switch under these circumstances
may improve the situation compared to the dirty regime only if the economy transits to
the inferior equilibrium, which is higher in the clean case. This effect depends, however,
on the parametrization of the model and will vanish for larger productivity gaps between
the clean and the dirty technology. To conclude, taken alone, taxation of fossils also seems
to be an inappropriate instrument to generate a momentum effect for the transition from
dirty to clean production since the introduction of a tax reduces the overlap region.
We now consider a lump-sum financed subsidy of marginal production cost, cxc , for clean
energy services. The profit maximizing monopoly price modifies to
psxc = mc(Kc)(1− sc)cxc ,
with 0 ≤ sc < 1 denoting the subsidy rate. Consequently, the zero-profit condition writes
as
(psxc − (1− sc)cxc)xc = cxcφc,
such that equilibrium demand for each energy service increases to
xc =
φc
(1− sc)(mc − 1) (44)
and the level of final output is obtained as
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Figure 8: Clean technology is less productive. Panel (a): clean energy services are not
subsidized, panel (b): clean energy services are subsidized.
Y = A˜c
( Bcφc
φcsc + φc(1− sc)mc
)1−α
Kαc , (45)
which is increasing in sc. From the last two equations it becomes apparent that sc increases
the aggregate level of clean energy services Ncxx and thus Y via two channels: (i) clearly,
sc increases demand for intermediates directly, and (ii), indirectly, by an increase in the
marginal productivity of physical capital and thus capital accumulation which reduces
mc. The implementation of a subsidy on clean energy services is illustrated in Figure
8. Intuitively, a subsidy on clean energy services increases the demand for intermediates
and increases thus final output. Hence the marginal productivity of capital increases, see
(45), which shifts the q˙c = 0-isocline upwards. Moreover, in regime (C) the interior steady
state is below the interior steady state of regime (D). A higher position of the q˙c = 0-
isocline implies in addition that the relative importance of expectations has increased
to the left of the interior steady state and has been reduced to the right of it. Thus
the implementation of subsidies increases the likelihood that the superior steady state
will be reached. This is obviously the best outcome when the clean technology is used.
The result on the simultaneous implementation of a tax and a subsidy thus contrasts the
effects of an implementation of a pollution tax alone. There are three elements explaining
the difference of the policy in our model compared to the more traditional models. First,
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the policy in the present model does not need to be permanent but may be temporary
up to the point where sufficient momentum for the switch to the new clean trajectory
has been built. This contrasts to the more traditional Pigouvian pollution tax or to
conventional subsidies, which have to be permanent. In this respect our approach is
similar to the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2012) who use an approach with directed
technical change and sector-specific learning, generating the momentum effect. Because
policy is only temporary and the momentum effects come without costly use of inputs
overall costs of the policy are reduced. Second, contrary to Acemoglu et al. (2012), we
do not rely on the quite restrictive assumption of pure sector-specific learning but on
free market entry in the energy sector which is based on regular profit maximization of
firms. Third, our framework is characterized by multiple equilibria, where history and
expectations trigger the equilibrium selection process. Moreover, economic policy alters
the importance of expectations, i.e. the overlap region from which both steady states can
be reached. If economic policy improves the TFP of the clean technology it increases the
probability that agents coordinate to reach a superior clean equilibrium. In an extreme
case they may already do so without policy or with minimal taxes and subsidies so that the
energy transition may become quite inexpensive. Of course, to promote the coordination
with given indeterminacy the government has to send out credible signals so that the
private sector has an incentive to move. At the same time it is important to stress that
we cannot quantitatively compare the costs of these policies to the conventional policy
approach because they are based on a different model setup. A direct comparison would
require a deeper microeconomic analysis of the process coordinating the expectations,
which is certainly an interesting and relevant endeavor, but given the current state of the
literature a demanding novel project which is left for future research.
6 Summary and conclusions
The paper at hand studies the macroeconomic effects of a policy-induced switch from
dirty to clean production. Notably, we identify macroeconomic conditions under which
policy instruments are able to trigger development with sufficient momentum, fostering
at the same time economic activity and environmental quality. We present a generic
macroeconomic model with capital accumulation and a detailed energy sector to study
the interplay between policies and the multiplicity of equilibria. In the model, energy
is an aggregate of heterogenous services, which differ in terms of fixed production costs,
efficiency, and pollution impact. We derive how economic policy can, under certain con-
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ditions, generate broad momentum, moving an economy to a permanently higher activity
level. This constitutes an especially attractive option for policy making.
To analyze the transformation of the energy sector we assume that final output is pro-
duced by two types of intermediate input: dirty or clean. Dirty intermediates rely on
capital and fossil energy services while clean intermediates employ capital and renewable
energy services. Initially, only the dirty technology is active. We incorporate a number
of crucial stylized facts into our model. First, in our model, energy sectors feature im-
portant elements of the industry. Specifically, we assume that energy services are based
on the conversion of heterogeneous energy sources like oil, coal, wind, solar, etc. Hetero-
geneity is given by specific attributes of each energy source, such as fixed costs, supply
intermittency, back-up capacity, and pollution intensity. As a consequence of these het-
erogeneities, both quantity and variety of energy services have a productive value. Put
differently, the productivity of the overall energy mix depends both on quantitative and
qualitative aspects of the different energy sources.
Our framework distinguishes two regimes: (1) only a dirty technology is active, and (2)
only a clean technology is used. Each regime is characterized by multiple steady states.
For a range of initial state variables, the evolution of the economy is subject to global in-
determinacy in the sense that the trajectories leading to either the superior or the inferior
steady state overlap such that expectations determine the equilibrium selection process.
Outside the region of the overlap initial conditions, i.e. history, determines whether the
inferior or the superior equilibrium is reached. Economic policy and the state of the
economy expressed by installed capital equipment determine whether history or expec-
tations shape the transition to the inferior or superior equilibrium. In an extreme case,
energy policy determines even the number of equilibria: if factor productivity is reduced
(increased) drastically, only the inferior (superior) equilibrium may survive. Energy pol-
icy is thus not only determining transitory behavior of an economy but also its long-run
performance.
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Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Maximization problem of a typical firm in sector j
The Hamiltonian in current values reads
Hj = pjYj −
∫ Nj
0
pj(νj)xj(νj)dνj − Ij
[
1 + θ
( Ij
Kj
)η]
+ qj
[
Ij − δKj
]
. (A.1)
From
∂Hj
∂xj(νj)
=
∂Hj
∂xj(ν′j)
= 0 it follows that
xj(νj) = xj(ν
′
j)
(pj(νj)
pj(ν ′j)
) mj
1−mj . (A.2)
Noting that
(1− α)Yj =
∫ Nj
0
pj(νj)xj(νj)dνj (A.3)
and combining (A.3) with (A.2) yields
xj(ν
′
j) =
(1− α)Yjpj(ν ′j)
mj
1−mj∫ Nj
0
pj(νj)
1
1−mj dνj
. (A.4)
∂H
∂I
= 0 implies
qj = 1 + (1 + η)θ
( Ij
Kj
)η
. (A.5)
From
∂Hj
∂Kj
= r¯qj − q˙j we obtain
q˙j = (r¯ + δ)qj −
[
pjα
Yj
Kj
+ θη
( Ij
Kj
)1+η]
. (A.6)
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A.2 Labor market equilibrium in regime (C)
Profit maximizing demand for labor and clean energy implies
(1− α)(1− β)Yc
Lc
= w (A.7)
(1− α)β Yc
Ec
= pE,c. (A.8)
Profit maximizing demand for labor in the clean energy sector implies
pE,cBE,c = w. (A.9)
Combining the last equation with (A.7), (A.8) and noting that Ec = BE,cLE,c yields
LE,c =
β
1− βLc. (A.10)
Oserving further the resource constraint for the labor market, Lc + LE,c = 1, yields
Lc = 1− β (A.11)
LE,c = β. (A.12)
A.3 The representative household
The associated Hamiltonian in current values writes as
H = c
1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ(w + pi + r¯b− c). (A.13)
The necessary conditions are given by
∂H
∂c
= 0 → c−σ = λ, (A.14)
∂H
∂b
= ρλ− λ˙ = r¯λ, (A.15)
and limt→∞ λbe
−ρt = 0.
The small open economy assumption requires for interior solutions that ρ = r¯. Hence,
it follows from (A.15) that λ˙ = 0 and λ = const. ∀ t. Therefore marginal utility of
consumption (A.14) is constant and the level of consumption is fixed for all t as well.
The flow budget constraint of the representative household reads b˙ = w+pi+ r¯b−c. Thus,
b˙ = (Y − CIj)− p¯EdEd − c+ r¯b. (A.16)
Integrating the last expression yields∫ ∞
0
c(t)e−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
(Y − CIj)− p¯E,dEd
]
dt+ b0 (A.17)
= ν0. (A.18)
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A.4 Steady state(s)
A.4.1 Model with exogenous mark ups
Here, we discuss the stability properties and the number of steady states in our framework
with exogenous, i.e. constant mark-ups, which serves as a tractable benchmark case for
the subsequent analysis. We refer to the dirty regime only since the characteristics of the
clean regime are qualitatively the same. The dynamic system reads as
K˙d = Id − δKd, (A.19)
q˙d = (r¯ + δ)qd −
(
α
Yd
Kd
− ∂CId
∂Kd
)
(A.20)
From the first order conditions of the associated control problem, we obtain
Id =
( qd − 1
(1 + η)θ
) 1
η
Kd, (A.21)
such that
K˙d =
[( qd − 1
(1 + η)θ
) 1
η − δ
]
Kd. (A.22)
As moreover
∂CId
∂Kd
= θη
( Id
Kd
)1+η
, (A.23)
it follows that
q˙d = (r¯ + δ)qd −
[
α
Y
Kd
− θη
( qd − 1
(1 + η)θ
) 1+η
η
]
. (A.24)
Imposing steady state conditions, yields
K˙d = 0 → qd∗ = 1 + (1 + η)θδη (A.25)
q˙d = 0 → (r¯ + δ)[1 + (1 + η)θδη]− ηθδ1+η = α Y
Kd
. (A.26)
In the dirty regime, MPKd reads as
αA˜
(Bd
md
) (1−α)(1−γ)
1−β˜(1−γ)
K
(α+β)(1−γ)−1
1−β˜(1−γ)
d , (A.27)
where md is the exogenous markup over marginal production costs.
Thus,
Kd∗ =
( αA˜
(r¯ + δ)[1 + (1 + η)θδη]− ηθδ1+η
) 1−β˜(1−γ)
1−(α+β)(1−γ)
(Bd
md
) (1−α)(1−γ)
1−(α+β)(1−γ)
. (A.28)
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The Jacobian of the dynamic system reads[
∂q˙d
∂qd
∂q˙d
∂Kd
∂K˙d
∂qd
∂K˙d
∂Kd
]
. (A.29)
The eigenvalues are obtained from
(
∂q˙d
∂qd
− λ)(∂K˙d
∂Kd
− λ)− ∂K˙d
∂qd
∂q˙d
∂Kd
. (A.30)
As ∂K˙d
∂Kd
= 0, the characteristic polynomial boils down to
λ2 − ∂q˙d
∂qd
λ− ∂K˙d
∂qd
∂q˙d
∂Kd
. (A.31)
Noting further that in steady state
∂q˙d
∂qd
= r, (A.32)
∂q˙d
∂Kd
=
α[1− (α + β)(1− γ)]A˜[Kαd (Bd/md)1−α]
1−γ
1−β˜(1−γ)
(1− β˜(1− γ))K2d
, (A.33)
∂K˙d
∂qd
=
δ1−ηKd
η(1 + η)θ
, (A.34)
∂K˙d
∂Kd
= 0 (A.35)
it follows that ∂q˙d
∂qd
, ∂K˙d
∂qd
∂q˙d
∂Kd
> 0 and
λ1,2 =
r
2
±
√
r2
4
+
∂K˙d
∂qd
∂q˙d
∂Kd
, (A.36)
=
r
2
±
√√√√r2
4
+
α[1− (α + β)(1− γ)]A˜[Kαd∗(Bd/md)1−α]
1−γ
1−β˜(1−γ) δ1−η
(1− β˜(1− γ))η(1 + η)θKd∗η(1 + η)θ
. (A.37)
Thus, Kd∗ ∈ ℜ+ specified by (A.28) is unique and saddle-point stable with λ1 > 0 and
λ2 < 0.
A.4.2 Model with endogenous mark ups
(1) The Jacobian
We set κ = 2, such that
md =
sj
sj − 1 , (A.38)
sj = M + µ(Kj)
2. (A.39)
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The entries of the Jacobian are the same, except
∂q˙d
∂Kd
=
αA˜[Kαd (Bd/md)
1−α]
1−γ
1−β˜(1−γ)
(1− β˜(1− γ))K2d
F
sd(sd − 1) , (A.40)
with F = [1−(1−γ)(α+β˜)][s2d−M(1+(Kd)2)]−(1−α)(1−γ)2(Kd)2µ−(Kd)2(µ+M).
(2) Necessary condition for multiple steady states
The q˙ = 0-isocline is implicitly defined by (39). Applying the Implicit function
theorem, the slope of the q˙ = 0-isocline is obtained as
∂qj
∂Kj
≈ dqj
dKj
=
∂MPKj
∂Kj
(r¯ + δ)−
(
qj−1
(1+η)θ
) 1
η
. (A.41)
For economically meaningful constellations, the denominator of the above expression
is always positive, such that
sign
{
∂qj
∂Kj
}
= sign
{
∂MPKj
∂Kj
}
, (A.42)
where
MPKj =
αA˜jK
αγ˜j−1
j B
(1−α)γ˜j
j
m
(1−α)γ˜j
j
(A.43)
with γ˜d =
(1−γ)
1−β˜(1−γ)
and γ˜c = 1.
Thus
lim
K→0
MPKj = ∞ (A.44)
lim
K→∞
MPKj = 0, (A.45)
as long as κ > 1.
Moreover, in light of (A.42) the necessary condition for the emergence of multiple
steady states is that at least once
∂MPKj
∂Kj
= 0, such that
(αγ˜j − 1)K−1j + γ˜j(α− 1)m−1j
∂mj
∂Kj
= 0, (A.46)
⇒ (αγ˜j − 1)mj
Kj
= γ˜j(1− α)∂mj
∂Kj
. (A.47)
If κ = 2, the last expression exhibits two roots {Kj,1;Kj,2}. In light of (A.44) and
(A.45), Kj,1 is a local minimum and Kj,2 is a local maximum of the q˙ = 0-isocline.
Thus, there are three steady states, if in addition
qj,1(Kj,1) < qj,∗ (A.48)
qj,1(Kj,2) > qj,∗. (A.49)
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(3) Emergence of complex conjugate eigenvalues. Since
λ1,2 =
r
2
±
√
r2
4
+
∂K˙d
∂qd
∂q˙d
∂Kd
, (A.50)
inspection of (A.40) reveals that the emergence of complex conjugate eigenvalues
requires F < 0. Note moreover that
(i) F = F (Kd) is a polynomial of the fourth degree and exhibits thus four roots.
(ii) Hence ∂F
∂Kd
exhibits three roots, where
∂F
∂Kd
= [1− (α + β˜)(1− γ)]2Kdµ(2K2dµ+ 2M − 1)− 4Kdµ(1− γ) (A.51)
and ∂F
∂Kd
= 0 at
Kd1 = 0, (A.52)
Kd2 =
1/2
√
Φ
[1− (α + β˜)(1− γ)]µ, (A.53)
Kd3 =
−1/2√Φ
[1− (α + β˜)(1− γ)]µ, (A.54)
with Φ ≡ −2µ[1−(α+β˜)(1−γ)][2µ(α+β˜)(γ−1)−3(1+α(1−γ))+β(1−γ)+2γ].
At Kd1 = 0, we obtain
F (0) = [(1− (α + β˜)(1− γ)][M2 +M ] > 0. (A.55)
As F (Kd) exhibits four roots and three extrema, it follows that F (0) is a local max-
imum and F (Kd2);F (Kd3) are local minima, where Kd3 < 0 and Kd2 > 0.
Since (i) and (ii) imply that F (Kd2) < 0, there are two complex conjugate eigenval-
ues, if the interior steady state falls in between the two positive roots of F and A˜j
is sufficiently large, i.e. A˜j > A˜j,crit, see (A.40) and (A.50).
B Parameters
We set as usual α = 0.3. Capital depreciation per year is set to 4%. β = 0.18 implies
realistically an income share of energy around 10%. Total factor productivity in the
production of dirty energy is Bd = 0.95 and for clean services 95% of Bd. This is in
reality not necessarily the case but we need marginal differences in order to observe
numerically comparable cases. The remaining parameters are fixed in an iterative way in
order to achieve a transition period of around 200 years, a reasonable distance between
the steady states and comparability between the energy regimes. The interest rate is set
to 6%, γ = −0.1, BEc = 0.56, θ = 20, η = 2.5, µ = 1.095 and µ = 0.35.
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